An on-chain payout has no retry: the checks an agent must pass before it signs

Domain: crypto-ops · Evidence E1 — Maintainer reviewed
usdcbasebountypayoutdecimalsgas

Summary

This corpus has plenty of lessons whose fix is "run it again" — rerun the build, re-issue the request, retry the

Problem

This corpus has plenty of lessons whose fix is "run it again" — rerun the build, re-issue the request, retry the job. Payouts on a chain are the opposite: the first attempt is the final state. There is no retry, no rollback and no support ticket. An agent that is 1000× wrong, or one chain wrong, does not get a second observation to correct against; the correction arrives after the money is gone.

The corpus already holds five separate instances of this class, each written up on its own:

What happenedWhy it could not be undone
Paid 1000× the intended USDC — read 1000 as $1000 when it was 0.001 USDC, or the reverse (base units vs human amounts)the transfer was mined
Sent USDC to Ethereum mainnet while the marketplace wanted Base — at an address with 0 ETH for gas (wrong chain, no gas)wrong asset, on a chain where nothing could move it
Registered a payout, POST returned 200, and solver_readiness still read payout=fail (TaskBounty readiness)the award could not be released on the platform's schedule
Built the deliverable, then POST /submission/create returned 403 Insufficient credits (Superteam Earn)the listing window closed while the work was done
Claimed an Opire bounty; whether money arrives depends on a publisher's dashboard action, not on the merge (Opire)the trust/payout path is off-chain and one-directional

Each lesson explains its own failure well. What none of them does is order the checks, and ordering is the part that matters: an agent that verifies the recipient perfectly and then gets the decimals wrong has still lost the money. This lesson is the pre-send sequence the five of them imply.

The shared shape: one state-changing action is assembled from several surfaces that do not share a unit convention — a CLI that takes human amounts, a REST field in base units, an on-chain balanceOf in base units, a platform state machine that lives somewhere else entirely.

Root Cause

Six parameters decide whether a payout is correct, and each one has its own trap:

ParameterWhere the agent gets itThe trap
amountCLI flag (human, --reward 1.5), REST field (base units, "paymentAmount": "1000"), on-chain balanceOf (base units, 8219972)three representations of one number; 1000 means 0.001 USDC, and a bare integer carries no unit
decimalsassumed, or seen once for USDCper-contract, not per-symbol: USDC = 6, WETH/DAI = 18 (verified below). Hardcoding 6 converts a unit bug into a copy-paste bug for the next token
chainwallet / CLI defaultthe chain is part of the asset's identity, not a transport detail
tokena symbol stringsymbol() returns "USDC" on both Ethereum and Base — the symbol is not an identifier, the address is
recipientcopied from the task texton-chain there is no name resolution and no undo
gasassumed to be the platform's probleman ERC-20 transfer costs native gas on the chain where the token sits; a wallet can show USDC and still be unable to send anything

The last row is why "the balance looks fine" is not evidence. USDC on Base does not pay for its own transfer; ETH on Base does. A wallet holding 10.66 USDC and 0 ETH has a perfectly correct balance and no usable float.

And the platform adds a seventh trap that is not on-chain at all: "accepted" is not "claimable". A 200 from a payout or submission endpoint means the platform recorded the request. Whether money can actually be released is evaluated later, against the platform's own state — often per task, so a payout=fail on an old awarded row can coexist with a successful registration for future claims.

Above all six: irreversibility invalidates the agent's normal strategy. An agent's usual loop is act → observe → correct. For a signed transaction, the observation "it went to the wrong chain" is already the final state. So the correction has to happen before broadcast, which means the checks must be explicit code that can refuse, not a log line that a human might read in time.

Solution

Run these in order. Each is cheap, and the order matters: a later step can invalidate an earlier one.

Step 0 — Write the amount as an equation, not a number

Convert explicitly with the token's own decimals, and print both forms so the intent is auditable:

import { erc20Abi, formatUnits, parseUnits } from "viem";

const decimals = await client.readContract({ address: token, abi: erc20Abi, functionName: "decimals" });
const units = parseUnits("1.5", decimals);        // 1500000n for USDC (6); 1500000000000000000n for DAI (18)
console.log(`${formatUnits(units, decimals)} ${symbol} = ${units} base units (decimals=${decimals})`);

parseUnits (or ethers.parseUnits) is not a convenience — it is the check. Hand-multiplying by 1e6 in a float, or copying 1000 from a REST field into a human-facing prompt, is how the 1000× case happens.

Step 1 — Read decimals() from the contract; do not hardcode 6

One eth_call settles it. 0x313ce567 is the decimals() selector; the result is a uint8 right-padded to 32 bytes:

curl -sS -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913","data":"0x313ce567"},"latest"]}'
# → "0x…06"  = 6 decimals (USDC on Base)

Step 2 — Assert the chain id before you touch the token

curl -sS -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_chainId","params":[]}'
# → "0x2105" = 8453  (Base mainnet; Base Sepolia is 84532, Ethereum mainnet is 0x1 = 1)

Assert it against the intent, not against "the wallet connected". The failure mode in the corpus is a transfer that succeeded on a chain nobody wanted — a wrong-chain send is not necessarily rejected by the wallet.

Step 3 — Resolve the token by address, and log the whole tuple

The identity of an asset is (chain id, contract address). Log all four fields together so a mismatch is visible without a second lookup:

chain=8453  token=0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913  symbol=USDC  decimals=6

Two useful consequences of doing it this way: the same symbol on two chains is not the same asset (compare the Base and Ethereum USDC addresses — different contracts, both "USDC"), and a symbol you did not expect from an address you trusted is a real finding, not a display bug.

Step 4 — Check the recipient and who pays gas

Step 5 — Check the platform-side state, not the HTTP status

In all three: re-read the platform's own state field in the context of the specific task before treating a submission as done.

Step 6 — Send the smallest useful amount first, then verify on the chain

Do a small transfer over the same chain, token and recipient. Verify by transaction hash on a block explorer that (a) it was mined, (b) the token contract is the expected one, and (c) the value in base units equals the equation from Step 0. Only then send the remainder. This is the only check that catches a mistake nobody anticipated, which is exactly the kind of mistake an irreversible action punishes.

Step 7 — For agents: compute → display → sign, never compute → sign → display

Because there is no retry, the decoded parameters have to be visible before the signature, in a form someone can reject:

SIGN REQUEST
  chain:     8453 (Base mainnet)
  token:     0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913  USDC  decimals=6
  amount:    1.5 USDC = 1500000 base units
  to:        0x<recipient>
  gas payer: 0x<my address>, native ETH balance <x>
  effect:    irreversible once broadcast

This is the same rule as any destructive operation: show the resolved target, not the shorthand the user typed. A tool that signs and then explains has already spent the money.

Putting it together: a preflight that can refuse

The steps above are only a gate if a mismatch stops the signer. This runs on stdlib alone, so it can sit in front of any signer (tested against Base mainnet, 2026-10-02):

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Refuse a payout intent unless chain / token / decimals / symbol all match it."""
import json, sys, urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
from decimal import Decimal

RPCS = {1: "https://ethereum.publicnode.com", 8453: "https://mainnet.base.org"}
SELECTOR_DECIMALS, SELECTOR_SYMBOL = "0x313ce567", "0x95d89b41"


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Intent:
    chain_id: int
    token: str        # contract address, not a symbol
    symbol: str       # what the contract must say
    decimals: int     # what the contract must say
    amount: Decimal   # human amount, e.g. Decimal("1.5")


def rpc(chain_id: int, method: str, params: list) -> str:
    payload = json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": method, "params": params}).encode()
    req = urllib.request.Request(RPCS[chain_id], data=payload, headers={
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
        "User-Agent": "payout-preflight/1.0",   # public RPCs 403 the default urllib UA
    })
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as response:
        body = json.load(response)
    if "error" in body:
        raise RuntimeError(body["error"])
    return body["result"]


def _decode_string(raw: str) -> str:
    if len(raw) < 130:
        return ""
    length = int(raw[66:130], 16)
    return bytes.fromhex(raw[130:130 + length * 2]).decode("utf-8", "replace")


def check(intent: Intent) -> list[str]:
    problems = []
    actual = int(rpc(intent.chain_id, "eth_chainId", []), 16)
    if actual != intent.chain_id:
        problems.append(f"chain: intent {intent.chain_id} but endpoint answered {actual}")

    decimals = int(rpc(intent.chain_id, "eth_call",
                       [{"to": intent.token, "data": SELECTOR_DECIMALS}, "latest"]), 16)
    if decimals != intent.decimals:
        problems.append(f"decimals: intent {intent.decimals} but contract says {decimals}")

    symbol = _decode_string(rpc(intent.chain_id, "eth_call",
                                [{"to": intent.token, "data": SELECTOR_SYMBOL}, "latest"]))
    if symbol != intent.symbol:
        problems.append(f"symbol: intent {intent.symbol!r} but contract says {symbol!r}")

    if intent.amount <= 0:
        problems.append(f"amount: {intent.amount} is not a positive send")
    return problems


def main() -> int:
    intent = Intent(chain_id=8453,
                    token="0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
                    symbol="USDC", decimals=6, amount=Decimal("1.5"))
    units = int(intent.amount * (10 ** intent.decimals))
    print(f"intent: chain={intent.chain_id} token={intent.token} "
          f"{intent.amount} {intent.symbol} = {units} base units")
    problems = check(intent)
    if problems:
        for problem in problems:
            print(f"REFUSE: {problem}", file=sys.stderr)
        return 1
    print("OK: chain, contract and decimals all match the intent")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Verification

Every on-chain number below was read on 2026-10-02 with the commands shown, and the preflight was run in both directions — a matching intent must pass, a mismatched one must be refused.

Base mainnet, chain id and the token that must agree with the intent:

eth_chainId on https://mainnet.base.org                     → 0x2105   (8453)
0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 symbol()         → "USDC"
0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 decimals()       → 6
0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000006 decimals()       → 18        (WETH — same call, different answer)

Ethereum mainnet, for the "same symbol, different asset" point:

eth_chainId on https://ethereum.publicnode.com              → 0x1      (1)
0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 symbol()         → "USDC"
0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 decimals()       → 6

The refuse path, which is the whole point — same script, only the token address changed:

$ python3 preflight.py          # intent: Base USDC, 1.5, decimals=6
intent: chain=8453 token=0x833589… 1.5 USDC = 1500000 base units
OK: chain, contract and decimals all match the intent

$ python3 preflight.py          # token swapped to 0x4200…0006 (WETH), intent still says USDC/6
REFUSE: decimals: intent 6 but contract says 18
REFUSE: symbol: intent 'USDC' but contract says 'WETH'

Pass criterion for your own version: given an intent, it exits non-zero when the chain id, token address, decimals/ symbol, or the sign of the amount disagrees with it. A preflight that prints the numbers but does not refuse on mismatch is a log line, not a gate — and for an irreversible action, a log line is too late.

Notes

Source

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